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1 – Introduction 
Science changes, among other ways, by generalizing the 
models it constructs. A scientific model of a phenomenon 
typically involves idealizations, and relaxing the model’s 
idealizations, when feasible, generalizes the model. The 
decision sciences construct both descriptive models that 
target actual choices and normative models that target ra-
tional choices. This paper explicates change in normative 
models of choice as the models remove idealizations. It ap-
plies the analysis of normative models in Weirich (2015).
Section 2 advances an account of models and their gener-
alizations. Section 3 illustrates the account’s application to 
normative decision theory using standard models of rational 
choice. Section 4 presents another illustration using a novel 
generalization of a standard model of rational choice that re-
moves the standard model’s idealization about deliberation 
costs. Because this generalization is novel, its presentation 
requires some groundwork, including an examination of 
types of utility. Section 5 heads off some possible misunder-
standings of the new model. Section 6 summarizes the paper’s 
characterization of a type of change in the decision sciences.
Change by generalizing models is just one type of change 
in normative decision theory, and generalizing models 
by removing idealizations is just one type of generaliza-
tion. I treat removal of idealizations because the literature 
on rational choice does not adequately characterize this 
type of change. Articulating methods of improving nor-
mative models of rational choice benefits decision theory.
2 – Models 
A set of conditions on a possible world characterizes a model, 
according to a sense explicated by Sugden (2002). Assum-
ing that the conditions do not specify a possible world, the 
model itself is either a possible world incompletely described 
by the conditions, or the set of possible worlds that meet the 
conditions, a set completely described by the conditions.
A model typically adopts idealizations to control for some fac-
tors that affect the phenomenon it treats. The idealizations 
hold in the model and not in the actual world. In contrast, 
general principles governing the phenomenon hold in both 
the model and in the actual world. The model’s idealizations 
control the operation of these principles. The model uses 
the idealizations to exhibit in a controlled setting the effect 
of some factors on the target phenomenon. Generalizing the 
model by relaxing idealizations accommodates additional 
factors that affect the phenomenon. Relaxing an idealization 
removes a control on some factors affecting the phenomenon 
and allows them to vary. For example, a familiar model of 
an ideal gas formulates the relationship between the gas’s 
pressure and volume using Boyle’s law, P1V1 = P2V2, under 
the idealization that the gas’s temperature is constant. A 
generalization of the model dispenses with the assumption 
of constant temperature and replaces Boyle’s law with the 
combined gas law, P1V1/T1 = P2V2/T2. Removing the idealiza-
tion removes the original model’s control of temperature.1
A model selects for study some factors affecting a phenom-
enon. For example, a model of an ideal gas may select vol-
ume’s effect on pressure. Although relaxing idealizations may 
change the effect some factors have on the phenomenon the 
model targets, a well-constructed model uses idealizations 
that do not change the effect the selected factors have on the 
phenomenon. As a result, both the original model and its 
generalization display the effect of the selected factors on the 
phenomenon. Even though additional factors affect the phe-
nomenon in the generalized model, the effect on the phenom-
enon of the factors that the original model selects is constant. 
For example, a model may select a variable and study its ef-
fect on the target phenomenon given various idealizations. 
A generalization of the model may relax an idealization that 
controls the effect of a second variable on the target phenom-
enon. A change in the first variable may produce a tenden-
A common type of change in science occurs as theorists generalize a model 
of a phenomenon by removing some idealizations of the model. This type of 
change occurs in the decision sciences and also in the normative branch of the 
decision sciences that treats rational choice. After presenting a general ac-
count of model generalization, the paper illustrates generalization of models 
in normative decision theory. The principal illustration generalizes a standard 
model of rational choice by removing the idealization that deliberation has no 
cost.
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1 - Fowler (1997, 3) observes that a model arises from idealizations that may be removed later to achieve a more general, realistic model. Mäki (2002, 
10–12) holds that a model’s idealizations commonly control for explanatory factors by removing those factors or holding them constant, as in controlled 
experiments.
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cy for the target phenomenon to change in both the original 
model and in the generalized model, even though in the gen-
eralized model the target phenomenon depends on the value 
of the second variable as well as the value of the first variable. 
In a model of an ideal gas that uses Boyle’s law and then gen-
eralizes using the combined gas law, increasing volume tends 
to decrease pressure in both the original model and also in 
its generalization, although this tendency may be countered 
in the generalized model by the tendency of increasing tem-
perature to increase pressure. A principle common to the two 
models is increasing volume’s tendency to decrease pressure.
Complete generalization of a model, with removal of all 
idealizations, is an elusive scientific goal. A completely 
generalized model’s characterization, independent of spe-
cial assumptions, specifies the set of all possible worlds, 
including the actual world, meeting general principles gov-
erning the target phenomenon. To shed light on the target 
phenomenon, less general models that rely on idealiza-
tions identify factors that operate in the models, as they 
do in the actual world, to produce the target phenomenon.
The following sections present some models of rational 
choice. Relaxing idealizations of the models illustrates 
generalization of a model in the decision sciences. The 
sections provide a characterization of a type of change in 
the decision sciences that yields progress toward realism.
3 – Information 
A model in normative decision theory typically adopts 
idealizations about agents and their decision prob-
lems and then formulates standards of rationality for the 
agents’ choices.2 A common model, using several ideal-
izations, claims that a rational choice maximizes utility.
A preliminary version of the common model assumes that an 
agent is cognitively ideal, fully informed, and faces a decision 
problem with a finite, Archimedean set of options to which 
the agent can assign a precise utility that evaluates an option 
comprehensively according to the agent’s evaluation of the 
option’s world, that is, the possible world that would be re-
alized if the option were realized, a world the model assumes 
exists. In this preliminary model, an agent’s maximizing util-
ity amounts to the agent’s maximizing informed utility, that 
is, adopting an option whose world, as represented by a prop-
osition that for every feature of a world that the agent cares 
about specifies whether the world has that feature, receives a 
utility at least as great as the utility of any other option’s world.
In the model a rational choice maximizes utility. This feature 
is normative and does not hold as a matter of definition. The 
model does not define rationality as utility maximization. It 
uses rationality in its ordinary, nontechnical sense of reason-
ableness, according to which an irrational choice is blame-
worthy. Its normative claims depend on fundamental norma-
tive principles. Also, its normative claims may fail without the 
model’s assumptions about the abilities and circumstances of 
agents and the features of the decision problems they face. 
For example, if an agent’s decision problem has no option of 
maximum utility, then the agent has a good excuse for not 
maximizing utility, and a failure to maximize is not irrational.
Normative decision theory advances by relaxing the prelimi-
nary model’s idealization that an agent is fully informed, while 
retaining the other idealizations. Instead of assuming that 
the agent is certain of the world that would be realized if an 
option were realized, a more general model assumes only that 
the agent assigns a probability to each world that might be 
the option’s world. Then a rational choice maximizes expect-
ed utility. It adopts an option such that the expected utility of 
the option’s world is at least as great as the expected utility 
of any other option’s world. That is, the probability-weighted 
average of the utilities of the possible worlds that might be the 
option’s world is at least as great as the analogous probabili-
ty-weighted average for any other option. Relaxing the ideal-
ization of complete information generalizes the preliminary 
model so that it accommodates cases in which an agent’s infor-
mation is incomplete as well as cases in which it is complete.
The generalized model takes an option’s utility to equal its 
expected utility. An option’s expected utility given com-
plete information is just the utility of the option’s world, so 
the generalized model extends the preliminary model’s ac-
count of an option’s utility. The generalized model chang-
es the preliminary model by extending principles of utility 
without altering the decision principle that requires utility 
maximization. The preliminary model and its generaliza-
tion for incomplete information share the principle that a 
rational choice maximizes utility. This principle is part of 
the preliminary model of a rational choice by a completely 
informed agent and also part of the generalized model of a ra-
tional choice by an agent who may be incompletely informed.
A model of rational choice advances principles of rational 
choice under its assumptions about agents and their decision 
problems. Some models attribute ideal cognitive powers to 
agents. Whether people have the cognitive powers of agents 
in the model is an empirical question; whether the model’s 
principles of rational choice govern agents with these powers 
is a normative, a priori matter. A normative model construct-
ed to advance claims about rational choice succeeds or fails 
depending on whether its principles of rational choice have 
the support of fundamental principles of rationality. The suc-
cess of the preliminary model and also its generalization is 
an a priori, not an a posteriori, matter because the prelim-
inary model and its generalization have the main objective 
of advancing normative, a priori principles. These norma-
tive models use a priori principles of rationality to classify 
choices, and make assumptions about agents, their circum-
2 - Colyvan (2013) describes normative models of rational choice.
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stances, and their decision problems to simplify formulation 
of principles of rational choice. An a priori principle of ra-
tionality that holds in all worlds may have assumptions that 
the worlds of a model meet but that the actual world does 
not meet. The principle may state that, given the conditions 
that characterize the model, rational choices satisfy cer-
tain requirements, such as utility maximization, even if in 
the actual world the requirements for a rational choice are 
more complex because the model’s conditions are not met.
A normative model of choice may partially explain the ratio-
nality of a choice in the real world by describing the opera-
tion of some factors that affect the choice’s rationality. The 
model partially explains the rationality of a choice by de-
scribing how some factors, such as utility maximization, play 
a role in settling its rationality. Utility maximization, along 
with the rationality of the utility assignment and the abilities 
and situation of the agent, fully explain the rationality of a 
choice in the actual world. A model may precisely describe 
the role of utility maximization in a controlled setting but not 
describe the operation of other factors explaining a choice’s 
rationality in the actual world. The model explains partially 
the rationality of a choice in the real world by fully explain-
ing the rationality of a choice in the model using factors that 
contribute to the explanation of the rationality of a choice in 
the actual world. The partial explanation assumes that the 
factors that explain the rationality of a choice in the model 
operate the same way in the real world but are joined by oth-
er factors affecting the rationality of the choice. Utility max-
imization affects the rationality of a choice in the real world 
together with other factors concerning the rationality of the 
utility assignment and the ability of the agent to maximize 
utility in the circumstances of the agent’s decision problem. 
A choice that does not maximize utility is irrational in the 
real world unless circumstances create good excuses, as they 
often do. In the model, idealizations prevent such excuses.
Generalizing a model of rational choice to accommodate in-
complete information relies on familiar principles concerning 
an option’s expected utility. The next illustration of a model’s 
generalization examines an agent’s means of evaluating an op-
tion. The generalization uses some novel principles concern-
ing an option’s evaluation that require a detailed presentation.
4 – Evaluation 
A standard model in normative decision theory supposes that 
an agent is cognitively ideal so that the agent may effortlessly 
evaluate each option’s world to assign it a utility. Relaxing the 
idealization that an agent is cognitively ideal generalizes the 
model. The generalized model extends principles of rational 
choice to agents who can effortlessly assign an option a utility 
only if the option’s evaluation processes a number of consid-
erations smaller than some limit. In the generalized model, a 
rational agent, for efficiency, evaluates an option by evaluat-
ing, not the option’s world, but the part of an option’s world 
that distinguishes it from other options’ worlds. For exam-
ple, the agent may put aside events in the option’s world that 
occur prior to the agent’s current decision problem. These 
events occur in every option’s world and do not distinguish 
the options’ worlds. An efficient, general evaluation of op-
tions reviews only events that distinguish the options’ worlds.
Peterson (2009) offers a good account of decision principles. 
Some decision principles demand certain procedures for 
making decisions, for example, the principle to reflect be-
fore making an important decision. Other principles require 
that a decision meet certain substantive conditions, such as 
maximizing utility. In ideal conditions, a rational agent in a 
decision problem not only realizes an option that maximiz-
es utility but also efficiently resolves the decision problem.
I treat evaluation of decisions rather than procedures for 
making decisions. However, the evaluation of decisions con-
siders an agent’s abilities and circumstances. It does not 
require a decision that maximizes utility if an agent cannot 
identify such a decision, or if the decision problem’s signif-
icance does not justify the effort of identifying such a deci-
sion. Efficient cost-free procedures for identifying options 
of maximum utility extend the requirement of utility maxi-
mization to agents who without these procedures pay a cost 
for identifying options that maximize utility, a cost that a de-
cision problem may not justify. Even if a choice’s rationali-
ty does not require following efficient procedures for iden-
tifying options of maximum utility, the availability of these 
procedures removes an excuse for not realizing an option 
of maximum utility. Their availability raises standards of 
rationality for an agent’s choice. Cognitive limits affect not 
only rationality’s demands concerning decision procedures 
but also rationality’s substantive demands on decisions.
This section begins with the previous section’s model for 
informed choice and then generalizes the model to handle 
a cognitive limit on processing considerations during an 
option’s evaluation and also simultaneously generalizes the 
model to handle incomplete information, applying the prin-
ciple of expected utility. The generalized model retains ide-
alizations of the preliminary model except for the idealiza-
tion of limitless processing of considerations; in particular, 
it retains the idealization that an agent has the cognitive ca-
pacity required for cost-free identification of considerations 
relevant to evaluation of options. The generalized model 
that accommodates limits on effortless processing of con-
siderations to evaluate options needs: first, a way of charac-
terizing the considerations that distinguish options’ worlds; 
second, a type of utility that evaluates just the distinguishing 
features of an option’s world; and, third, a justification for 
selecting an option according to evaluations of options that 
consider just the distinguishing features of options’ worlds.
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4.1 An Option’s Consequences
The events that distinguish an option’s world are those that 
occur if the option were realized but do not occur given ev-
ery option. According to Gibbard and Harper (1981), these 
events are the option’s consequences. An event is an option’s 
consequence if and only if it would occur if the option were 
realized but can be prevented by realizing another option. An 
option’s consequences in this sense exclude past events and 
also future events that no option can influence. An option’s 
consequences stand in a type of causal relation to the option, 
but are not the same as the option’s effects, because, for in-
stance, an option is a consequence of itself but is not an effect 
of itself.
4.2 Types of Utility
According to causal decision theory, which I assume, an op-
tion’s comprehensive utility is a probability-weighted average 
of the utilities of the worlds that might be the option’s world 
if the option were realized.3 In Section 3’s model of rational 
choice generalized for incomplete information but retaining 
other idealizations of the preliminary model, the probabili-
ty-weight for a world that might be the option’s world is the 
probability that if the option were realized, the world would 
be realized. For the sake of efficiency, causal decision theory 
may replace an option’s comprehensive utility with another 
type of utility that focuses on the option’s consequences. It 
may do this both for models of informed choice and for mod-
els of incompletely informed choice.
A type of utility applied to an option has an evaluative scope 
specifying the considerations that the evaluation apprais-
es. An option’s comprehensive utility, a widely-used type of 
utility, evaluates an option by evaluating the option’s world; 
the scope of its evaluation is comprehensive. Being compre-
hensive ensures it does not omit any feature of an option’s 
world that is relevant to the option’s evaluation in a decision 
problem. An option’s evaluation according to its consequenc-
es needs a type of utility with narrower evaluative scope than 
comprehensive utility. Comprehensive utility, even if applied 
to just an option’s consequences evaluates the world in which 
the option’s consequences obtain, and so evaluates the op-
tion’s world, not just the option’s consequences. 
An alternative type of utility that evaluates an option by eval-
uating just the option’s consequences I call “causal utility.” 
Its narrower evaluative scope makes it contrast with compre-
hensive utility, which evaluates an option by considering all 
that holds given the option. The definition of causal utility 
uses another type of utility, intrinsic utility, which has a very 
narrow evaluative scope. Intrinsic utility evaluates a possi-
ble event by considering only the a priori implications of the 
event’s occurrence. The causal utility of an option is the in-
trinsic utility of its consequences, and, given incomplete in-
formation, the expected intrinsic-utility of its consequences. 
Defined this way, an option’s causal utility surveys only the 
option’s consequences, as intended. In cases of incomplete 
information, an option’s causal utility equals the option’s 
expected causal utility computed using the option’s conse-
quences in the worlds that might be the option’s world.
4.3 Justification of Rankings
A justification of using options’ causal utilities to rank the 
options shows that the ranking of options according to their 
causal utilities is the same as their ranking according to their 
comprehensive utilities. To show this, a justification may 
demonstrate, in the case of complete information, that the 
comprehensive utility of an option is a sum of the option’s 
causal utility and the intrinsic utility of events in the option’s 
world that are not its consequences. Then it may establish 
that the second factor is the same for all options, so that an 
option’s rank according to the first factor, that is, its causal 
utility, is the same as its rank according to the sum of the first 
factor and the second factor, that is, its comprehensive utility. 
The following paragraphs provide this two-step demonstra-
tion.
The first step establishes that an option’s comprehensive util-
ity sums the option’s causal utility and the intrinsic utility 
other events in the option’s world. It uses a similar summa-
tion principle for intrinsic utilities. 
Intrinsic utilities express intrinsic attitudes of desire, aver-
sion, or indifference. An agent’s intrinsic attitude is basic if 
and only if none of the agent’s other intrinsic attitudes are 
among the agent’s reasons for it. Because the reasons for a 
basic intrinsic attitude are independent of the reasons for 
other attitudes, its realization has the same intrinsic utility no 
matter what other events occur. In an option’s world, the rel-
evant events are realizations of basic intrinsic attitudes, and 
so I take the option’s consequences and other events in the 
option’s world to be events of this type. The intrinsic utility 
of a set of events, an evaluation of the a priori implications 
of the set’s realization, equals the sum of the intrinsic util-
ities of realizations of basic intrinsic attitudes that the set’s 
realization entails. This additivity is a fundamental principle 
of intrinsic utility that Weirich (2015, Chap. 3) explicates. 
Because of this additivity, the intrinsic utility of an option’s 
world is the sum of the intrinsic utility of the option’s con-
sequences and the intrinsic utility of the other events in the 
option’s world.4
A bridge principle connects comprehensive and intrinsic util-
ity; the comprehensive utility of an option’s world equals the 
intrinsic utility of the option’s world, as both types of utility 
consider all relevant events in the option’s world. Also, an op-
tion’s causal utility is by definition the intrinsic utility of the 
option’s consequences. Hence, the summation principle for 
intrinsic utilities establishes that 
(1) an option’s comprehensive utility equals its causal 
utility plus the intrinsic utility of events in the option’s 
world besides its consequences. 
3 - Joyce (1999) argues for causal decision theory.
4 - In a rational ideal agent, a basic intrinsic desire is equivalent to a basic intrinsic preference for the realization of the desire as opposed to its non-realization. 
Krantz et al. (1971, Chap. 6) present methods of conjoint measurement that may use the independence of basic intrinsic preferences to establish a representation 
theorem for intrinsic utility. According to the theorem, given standard axioms for preferences among worlds and the independence of basic intrinsic preferences, 
the intrinsic utility of a world equals the sum of the intrinsic utilities of the basic intrinsic desires that the world realizes. The representation theorem shows the 
possibility of using preferences among worlds to measure intrinsic utilities, but does not yield a definition of intrinsic utility.
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Next, observe that for all the options, the same events, ex-
cept the options’ consequences, occur in the options’ worlds. 
This follows from Section 4.1’s definition of an option’s con-
sequences. Because all options are alike in their non-conse-
quences and because intrinsic utility evaluates events by eval-
uating their a priori implications, 
(2) for all options, the intrinsic utilities of their non-conse-
quences are the same. 
Points (1) and (2) are the two steps of the demonstration that 
the beginning of the section outlined. They justify ranking op-
tions according to their causal utilities. The options’ ranking 
according to their causal utilities is the same as their ranking 
according to their comprehensive utilities.
To illustrate the type of simplification that evaluation by caus-
al utility achieves, imagine this case. John considers whether 
to exercise. John is wise and remains wise whatever he de-
cides about exercise. His being wise is unavoidable. Howev-
er, he remains healthy if and only if he exercises. Health is a 
consequence of exercise. John cares only about being healthy 
and being wise. He has a basic intrinsic desire for each. The 
comprehensive utilities of his options to exercise or not are, 
respectively, the intrinsic utility of the world in which he ex-
ercises and the intrinsic utility of the world in which he does 
not exercise. Also, a world’s intrinsic utility sums the intrinsic 
utilities of the objects of the basic intrinsic desires it realizes. 
Letting E stand for John’s exercising, ~E stand for his not 
exercising, U stand for comprehensive utility, and IU stand 
for intrinsic utility, the following equations state the options’ 
comprehensive utilities.5 
U(E) = IU(H & W) = IU(H) + IU(W)
U(~E) = IU(~H & W) = IU(~H) + IU(W) 
The causal utilities of John’s options evaluate just the con-
sequences of his options. Letting CU stand for causal utility, 
the next pair of equations states the options’ causal utilities.
CU(E) = IU(H) 
CU(~E) = IU(~H) 
The options’ comprehensive utilities involve a common fac-
tor, IU(W), that their causal utilities drop. Dropping the com-
mon factor does not affect comparisons of options: CU(E) > 
CU(~E) if and only if U(E) > U(~E). The ranking of John’s 
exercising and of John’s not exercising according to causal 
utility is the same as the ranking of these options according 
to comprehensive utility.
The justification of ranking options accord to their causal 
utilities extends straightforwardly to ranking options accord-
ing to their expected causal-utilities in the case of incomplete 
information.
5 – Objections and Replies 
According to a type of separability, which Broome (1991, 
Chap. 4) explicates, an event is separable from other events 
if its utility is the same no matter how other events are fixed. 
The summation principle for intrinsic utilities entails this 
type of separability for the intrinsic utility of an option’s 
consequences. More precisely, it entails that the combina-
tion of an option’s consequences is separable from the other 
events in the option’s world, with respect to intrinsic utili-
ty, given the agent’s rationality and the absence of cognitive 
limits, aside from the limit on an evaluation’s cost-free pro-
cessing of considerations. Is the combination of an option’s 
consequences in the option’s world in fact separable from 
the other events in the option’s world? Such separability re-
quires that the intrinsic utility of the option’s consequences 
be independent of events in the option’s past. However, in 
some cases it seems that past events affect the intrinsic util-
ity of an option’s consequences. This raises an objection to 
evaluation of options by their causal utilities, and a reply 
must defend the separability of an option’s consequences.
Suppose that I want to be the first king of Antarctica. This can 
happen only if the continent has had no king in the past. Only 
then does my becoming king now make me the first king. Giv-
en this, are the consequences of my becoming king separable 
from past events? Suppose that I have complete information 
about the option’s world. I use knowledge of the past to char-
acterize future events. In particular, I use knowledge of the 
existence of any past king of Antarctica to settle whether my 
now becoming king is my becoming the first king. If I know the 
continent has not had a king before, I know that my becoming 
its king now is my becoming its first king. My becoming its 
first king is then a consequence of my becoming its king now. 
An option’s evaluation may focus on its consequences even 
if the past plays a role in characterizing its consequences.
Note that the separability of an option’s consequences from 
other events in an option’s world requires only that the in-
trinsic utility of the option’s consequences be the same for 
any way of fixing the other events that is a priori compat-
ible with the option’s consequences. Hence, if becoming 
the first king of Antarctica is a consequence of my becom-
ing its king now, then the consequences’ separability from 
past events requires a constant intrinsic utility for the con-
sequences as past events change in ways a priori compati-
ble with the consequences. The utility of the consequenc-
es need not be constant for changes in the past, such as 
introduction of a past king of Antarctica, that prevent the 
occurrence of the consequence that I become its first king.
Given incomplete information, I use my knowledge of the 
past to characterize future prospects and their probabili-
ties; for each world that might be the option’s world, I use 
past events in the world to characterize the consequences in 
the world of the option’s realization. Then I maximize ex-
pected utility considering just the consequences of options. 
In general, although the past plays a role in characterizing 
an option’s consequences, once they have been character-
ized, they are separable from other events. Rationality, in 
5 - IU(~H) equals the intrinsic utility of not realizing any basic intrinsic desires. It need not equal the strength of a basic intrinsic aversion to not being healthy. In the example, 
John has no basic intrinsic aversions.
18
N° 1   2018
Vol. 5
Change
in the
DeCision sCienCes 
fact, requires this type of separability for an agent who is 
almost cognitively ideal, as in the model of Section 4. Be-
cause intrinsic utilities evaluate events using only their a 
priori implications, the intrinsic utility of an option’s con-
sequences is the same regardless of the other events in 
the option’s world. The separability that the summation 
principle implies stands confirmed. Therefore, an option’s 
evaluation may justifiably use the option’s causal utility.
Another objection to Section 4’s justification of evaluation 
by causal utility targets the definition of a basic intrinsic 
desire. An intrinsic desire obtains considering only the a 
priori implications of the object of desire. A basic intrinsic 
desire, according to the definition stated, does not have as 
a reason another intrinsic desire. Is this definition of a ba-
sic intrinsic desire faithful to intuitions about basic intrinsic 
desires? Satisfying a desire to see my son do well may also 
satisfy a desire for pleasure. Suppose both desires are basic 
intrinsic desires. Does the definition of a basic intrinsic de-
sire accommodate this possibility? Pleasure is a reason for 
wanting that my son do well. Does the definition of a basic 
intrinsic desire therefore disqualify my desire that my son 
do well, contrary to intuition, because another intrinsic 
desire, the desire for pleasure, is a reason for the desire? 
No, the case does not create a problem for the definition. 
An agent may have both an intrinsic desire and an extrinsic 
desire that some event occur. I may have an extrinsic desire 
that my son do well in addition to an intrinsic desire that he 
do well. I desire that my son do well because of its a priori 
implications; hence this desire is intrinsic. Also, I desire that 
my son do well because his doing well brings me pleasure; 
hence this desire is extrinsic. The intrinsic desire for plea-
sure grounds the extrinsic desire that my son do well, but 
not the intrinsic desire that he do well. The intrinsic desire 
that he do well considers only the a priori implications of 
satisfaction of the desire, and the desire’s satisfaction does 
not entail pleasure. Pleasure is a consequence, but not an a 
priori implication, of my son’s doing well. The intrinsic de-
sire that my son do well may, therefore, be a basic intrinsic 
desire not grounded in any other intrinsic desire. Because 
the intrinsic desire for pleasure is not a reason for my in-
trinsic desire that my son do well, the latter may qualify as 
a basic intrinsic desire. Only the extrinsic desire that my 
son do well is grounded in the intrinsic desire for the plea-
sure his flourishing brings. The definition of a basic intrin-
sic desire therefore does not clash with intuition in this case.
6 – Conclusion 
The previous sections presented some models of ratio-
nal choice. Section 3 presented a standard model for 
expected-utility maximization and then relaxed ideal-
izations about information. Section 4 generalized the 
standard model by relaxing an idealization about de-
liberation costs. Section 5 defended this generalization. 
Relaxing the idealizations of full information and of limitless, 
cost-free processing of considerations illustrates a method of 
generalizing models in normative decision theory that exem-
plifies a common type of change in science. Initial idealizations 
simplify a model’s treatment of a phenomenon, and succeed-
ing models generalize by relaxing idealizations. The result is 
greater realism. This characterization of a type of change in 
normative decision theory advances the decision sciences.
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